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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
of the Bankruptcy Act, was entitled to release from all his provable debts
except in case of six specified classes of obligations. Negligent delay did
not fall within any of the latter class, and since debt was provable, bank-
rupt was able to obtain relief. Res adjudicata was not considered by the
court.
It is submitted that the prevailing law as announced in the principal
case is arbitrary, technical, unfounded on reason or policy. Precluding a
petitioner merely because of delay on the fiction of a judgment determining
his rights has been an expedient way for the courts to dispose of the matter,
without further examination into the nature of the bankruptcy law. The
logic of the case of In Re Glasberg, supra, is unrefutable, for the statute
expressly endows the bankrupt with the benefit of being relieved of all
provable debts, except in certain cases of which delay is not one. At least,
the court can exercise a discretion in granting a discharge in view of a
conflict between Sections 14 and 17 of the Act. That such discretion should,
in the usual case, be resolved in favor of the bankrupt rests upon a consid-
eration of the purposes of bankruptcy legislation. Historically, of course,
the law has been a device to be invoked for the protection of the creditors,
and the idea of a discharge of obligations has been of relatively recent
birth, making its first appearance in the legislation of Congress in 1841.
Once implanted in the operation of the bankruptcy law, this feature has
produced invaluable results, as a means of rehabilitating the luckless.
Further evaluation seems superfluous, in view of the position of the Supreme
Court of the United States where it declared, in Local Loan Co. v. Huni
(1934), 292 U. S. 234, as follows: "One of the primary purposes of the
bankruptcy act is to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive
indebtedness, and to permit him to start afresh, free from the obligations
and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.. .. The various
provisions (of discharge) were adopted in the light of that view and are
to be construed when reasonably possible in harmony with it so as to
effectuate the general purpose and policy of the act." Upon such a mandate,
the courts of bankruptcy should feel impressed with the wisdom of a full
reconsideration of the rule announced in the instant case.
W. C. K. '36.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - POLICE POWER - BILLBOARDS. - The following
amendment became part of the Constitution of Massachusetts in 1918: "Ad-
vertising on public ways, in public places and on private property within
public view may be regulated and restricted by law." Mass. Const. Amend.
Art. 50. Under this provision the legislature conferred on the State Depart-
ment of Public Works general jurisdiction over advertising signs on public
ways "or on private property within public view of any highways, public
park or reservation." Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) C. 93 secs. 29-33. The De-
partment of Public Works issued regulations prohibiting the maintenance of
billboards and other signs for outdoor advertising purposes without a permit
and also prohibiting the issuance of permits for outdoor advertising within
certain distances of public parks, reservations and highways.
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Companies with over $5,000,000 invested in their plants, advertising
devices, etc., sought an injunction restraining the enforcement of the regu-
lations. Compliance with the orders would require them to remove or
relocate 96% of their signs and billboards. Held Decree refused and the
regulations upheld as constitutional. General Outdoor Adv. Co. et al. v.
Dep't. of Public Works (1935) Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., reported in U. S. Law
Week, Jan. 22, 1935, p. 8.
The court gave as the primary basis of its decision the promotion of
public safety under the police power. Aesthetic considerations were given
as another ground, it being held that where regulations are justified by
their primary and substantive purpose "considerations of taste and beauty
may enter as auxiliary."
The court follows the well established rule that aesthetic considerations
alone are not sufficient to justify legislation under the police power. Notes
34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 998 and L. R. A. 1917A, 1220. The rule is applicable
to billboard regulation. City of Passaic v. Patterson Bill Posting Co. (1905)
72 N. J. L. 285, 62 Atl. 267; Commonwealth v. Boston Adv. Co. (1905) 188
Mass. 348, 74 N. E. 601; People v. Murphy (1900) 195 N. Y. 126, 88 N. E.
17; Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School (1911) 249 Ill.
436, 94 N. E. 920 comment (1932) 17 St. Louis Law Rev. 371. But the
inclusion of aesthetic reasons will not invalidate a law sustainable on ortho-
dox grounds. Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago (1915) 267 Ill. 344, 108 N. E.
340, aff. (1917) 242 U. S. 526; St. Louis Poster Adv. Co. v. St. Louis (1919)
249 U. S. 269. Aesthetic considerations, moreover, are held to be a valid
justification for the exercise of the police power when other recognized
grounds exist. Ware v. City of Wichita (1923) 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99.
This is also the well recognized rule in Massachusetts, and thus the prin-
cipal case is clearly with the weight of authority. Atty. Gen'l. V. Williams
(1899) 174 Mass. 476, 55 N. E. 77; Commonwealth v. Boston Adv. Co.,
supra; Parker -. Commonwealth (1901) 178 Mass. 199, 59 N. E. 634;
Welch v. Swasey (1907) 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745; Opinion of the
Justices (1920) 234 Mass. 597, 127 N. E. 525.
The decision in the principal case, like others involving billboards and
zoning, in effect makes aesthetics the controlling factor but hides behind
general statements as to public safety. No accidents were shown to have
resulted from the "intrusion of public announcements" before the eyes of the
public, yet the main basis of the decision was said to be public safety.
Cf. Schait v. Senior (1922) 97 N. J. L. 390, 117 Atl. 517 ("a reasonable
regulation touching public health, safety and general welfare"); Opinion of
The Justices, supra, ("rational relation to the health and safety of the
community"); Ware v. City of Wichita, supra ("a reasonable zoning ordi-
nance with some pertinent relation to the health, safety, morals and general
welfare of the community").
Though as yet no court has gone so far as to sustain a statute or ordi-
nance as a valid exercise of the police power on the grounds of asethetics
alone, several courts by way of dictum have indicated the tendency in that
direction. State v. New Orleans (1923) 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440; State v.
Houghton (1920) 144 Minn. 14, 176 N. W. 159; State v. Harper (1923) 182
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss2/16
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451. It would seem that the courts should abandon the
sham to which they have resorted and expressly make aesthetics a ground
for the exercise of the police power. Cf. Freund Police Power (1904) sec.
182, "It is conceded that the police power is adequate to restrain offensive
noises and odors. A similar protection to the eye, it is conceived, would not
establish a new principle, but carry a recognized principle to further
applications."
A. J. G. '36.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TRAL BY JuRY-ADDITUR-Plaintiff brought a
personal injuries suit in a United States District Court; the jury returned
a verdict in his favor for $500; the court ruled in favor of a new trial for
inadequacy of damages unless defendant should consent to an increase to
the sum of $1500. Defendant's consent resulted in an automatic denial of
plaintiff's motion for a new trial. Plaintiff appealed to the Circuit Court of
Appeals, whence certiorari to the Supreme Court. Held The action of the
trial court was unconstitutional as a violation of Amendment VII of the
United States Constitution providing that "In suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
reexamined in any court of the United States than according to the rules
of the common law." Dimick v. Schiedt (1935) 55 S. Ct. 296, 79 L. Ed. 256.
The court premised its decision on the accepted interpretation of Amend-
ment VII as embodying the common law as it existed at the time of the
adoption of the constitutional provision. United States v. Wonson (1812)
28 Fed. Cas. 745, at 750; Thompson v. Utah (1898) 170 U. S. 343; Capital
Traction Co. v. Hof (1899) 174 U. S. 1 at 8; Patton v. United States (1930)
281 U. S. 276. As far back as the Year Books English judges increased
inadequate verdicts in cases of mayhem. 2 Bacon's Abridgment 611 (7th.
ed.) The practice continued well into the eighteenth century. Burton v.
Baynes (1733) Barnes notes 153, 94 Eng. Rep. 852; and see Brown v.
Seymour (1742) 1 Wils. 5, 95 Eng. Rep. 461; Beardmore v. Carrington
(1764) 2 Wils. 244, 95 Eng. Rep. 790. The court in the instant decision de-
clared it could find no more recent case than Burton v. Baynes, supra, in
which this power was actually exercised; it decided that by the end of the
eighteenth century the judicial power thus to increase damages had become
atrophied. Apparently the court's attention was not directed to Armytage
v. Haley (1843) 4 Q. B. 917 in which the plaintiff brought an action on
the case for negligence, recovered a nominal verdict and obtained a rule
to show cause why a new trial should not be granted unless defendant
would consent to an increase in damages. In any event, persistent dicta
gave the practice of additur at least an umbrageous existence in the English
courts until the beginning of the twentieth century. Judicial addition as
well as remission from verdicts was finally outlawed by the leading case of
Watt v. Watt (1905) A. C. 115.
The court was obliged to distinguish the present case from well estab-
lished decisions upholding the power of the federal trial judge to deny a
Washington University Open Scholarship
